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ABSTRACT 
The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) was constructed as part of the Manhattan Project during 
World War 11. The Manhattan Project was developed to usher in the use of nuclear weapons to 
end the war. The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear 
material (SNh4) for fabrication of nuclear devices for the war effort. Subsequcnt to the end of 
World War 11, the PFP’s mission expanded to support the Cold War effort Lhrough plutonium 
production during the nuclear arms race and later the processing of fuel grade mixed plutonium- 
uranium oxide to support DOE’s brcedcr reactor program. 
In October 1990, at the close of the production mission for PFP, a shutdown order was prepared 
by the Dcpartmcnt of Energy (DOE) in Washington DC and issued to the Richland DOE field 
oflice. Subsequent to the shutdown order, a team from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board (DNFSB) analyzed the hazards at PFP associated with the continued storage of certain 
forms of plutonium solutions ’and solids. The assessment identified m&y discrete actions that 
wcre required to stabilize the diffecnt plutonium forms into stable form and repackage the 
material in high integrity containers. These actions were technically complicated and completed 
as part of the PFP nuclear material stabilization project bctween 1995 and early 2005. The 
completion of the stabilization project was a necessary first step in deactivating PFP. 
During stabilization, DOE cntered into negotiations with the U.S. Environmcntal Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the State of Washington and established milestones for the Deactivation and 
Dccornmissioning (D&D) of the PFP. 
The DOE and its contractor, Fluor Hanford (Fluor), have made great progress in deactivating, 
decontaminating and decommissioning the PFP at the Hanford Site as dctailed in this paper. 
Background information covcring the PFP D&D effort includcs descriptions of negotiations with 
the State of Washington concerning consent-order milestones, milestones completed to date, and 
the vision of bringing PFP to slab-on-grade. Innovative approaches in planning and regulatory 
strategies, as well new technologies from within the United States and from other countrics and 
field decontamination techniques developed by workforce personnel, such as the “turkey roaster” 
and the “lazy Susan” are covered in dctail in the paper. Critical information on issues and 
opportunities during the performance of the work such as concerns regarding thc handling and 
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storage of special nuclear material, conccrns regarding criticality safety and the impact of SNM 
de-inventory at PFP are also provided. 
The continued success of the PFP D&D effort is due to the detailed, yct flexible, approach to 
planning that applied innovative techniqucs and tools, involved a team of experienced 
independent reviewers, and incorporatcd previous lessons learned at the Hanford site, Rocky 
Flats, and commercial nuclear D&D pr$jects. Multi-disciplined workcr involvement in the 
planning and the cxccution of the work has produced a committed workforce that has developed 
innovative tcchniques, resulting in safer and more efficient work evolutions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Opcntions at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford site in eastern Washington 
began in 1949. The PFP operations gave Hanford and the Manhattan Project the capabitity to 
make plutonium metal “buttons” for safer shipping of plutonium to weapons fabrications sites 
clscwhcrc in thc United States. The plant performed a variety of complicatcd chemical 
proccssing steps in the purification of plutonium solutions generated in Ilanford’s reprocessing 
plants by dissolution of spent rcactor fuc1 rods to recover plutonium. The first full-scale, remote 
mcchanical fabrication lines at PFP were built in the 1950s. The construction of a ncw 
Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) was complcted in 1964 and provided the capability to 
recover plutonium scrap to could be recycled into PFP’s final product, plutonium mctal 
“buttons.” 
The PFP scrved for over fiAy years as a commtone provider of plutonium fecd stocks to the 
United States nuclear weapons defense complex. An inventory of nuclear material remains at 
the plant along with a vdety  of residue forms adhering to the inside of process equipment, . 
piping, and proccss enclosures. 
In 1990, the weapons production mission ended at Hanford and the new Hanford mission 
centcrcd on the stabilization of the plutonium inventory, that is, materials that had not been 
completely processed to a stabiIized end point. Some of thcse residuals were in liquid form 
which was problcmatic from a criticality safety perspective. By 2004, 18 metric tons of leftover 
plutonium material had bccn stabilized and packaged for shipment from the Hanford site. 
PFP is now undergoing Deactivation and Decommissioning @&D) in ordcr to close the PFP 
Plant. This closure scope includes the D&D of 63 buildings Iocated on 15 acres. Residual 
plutonium remained in thousands of fcct of proccss equipment, drain lines and undcrground 
tanks, and waste sites. The PFP mission includes dispositioning the large inventory of Special 
Nuclear Material which was stabilized and packaged in DOE Standard 3013 containers, high 
intcgrity containcrs designed for up to 50 year storage. The mission also includes the 
stabilization and packaging of residue plutonium materials as transuranic waste. Approximately 
1800 drums of transuranic waste have already bcen shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 
New Mexico. 
The current progress for closure of PFP was made possible through severd key proccsscs: 
conducting negotiations with the State of Washington and the US EPA for milestones with the 
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vision of bringing PFP to slab-on-grade, innovative approaches in D&D planning and regulatory 
strategies, new technologies for D&D, and new techniques developed by workforce personnel. 
Challenges to ovcreome include handling and storage of special nuclear material while 
conducting D&D operations, concerns regarding criticality while handling fissile materials and 
working around the impact of delayed SNM dc-inventory at PFP. 
PFP CLOSURE PLANNING -THE CASE FOR ACCELERATED CLOSURE 
The scope of the PFP deactivation and decommissioning project includes cleanout and removal 
of all 63 above-grade structures and relatcd infrastructure to clean, slab-on-grade throughout the 
15 acre complex, and stabilizing all bdow-grade areas pending NEPA and CERCLA decisions 
on the final end state and remedial actions required across Hanford's central platcau. Significant 
challcngcs are associatcd with clcanup of any plutonium pmcssing and handling facility. 
Dccommissioning of PFP is considered particularly complex and hazardous. Key characteristics 
of the plant at the outsct of D&D included: 
Mom than 200 contamination cvcnts, 2 explosions and M inadvcrtcnt criticality ovcr 50 
years of operation 
18 metric tons of spccial nuclcar material to be stabilized and packaged for storage or 
disposal 
23,226 square mctcrs of plutonium processing area 
4 rcmote process cells and 4 major chcmical storage arcas 
23 1 gloveboxes, hoods and conveyors 
21 vaults and vault-type rooms 
An cstimated inventory of 0.1 metric ton of plutonium remaining in the complex process 
systems and 0.2 metric tons in below grade waste tanks and sites 
Over 600 plutonium solution storage containers with residuals ' 
An estimated 60,000 cubic meters of radioactive waste and debris to be dispositioncd 
Prior to fiscal ycar 2000, the baseline plan for PFP D&D was structurcd in four phases: 
stabilization and packaging of the plutonium inventory (terminal clcanout operations in 
regulatory terms); facility and process cleanopt and deactivation (the "transition" phase); an 
extendcd survcillance and maintenance phase awaiting shipment of the plutonium inventory to 
other DOE sites and PFP's position in the site cleanup funding qucue; and a f ind 
dccommissioning and demolition phase. The plan spanncd dccadcs, completing in 2038 at a life 
cycle cost of $2.6 billion, 
By early fiscal year 1999, it was clear that this baseline was no longer viable. It was too costly- 
with provisions for years of unproductive surveillance and maintenance while awaiting D&D 
funding and twenty ycars of escalating costs. The 40 ycar duration of the clcanup plan was also 
inconsistent with DOE'S then-developing accelerated cleanup objectives. Furthermore, by this 
time Hanford had completed several pilot projects in accelcratcd deactivation of major nuclear 
facilitics, including the PUREX and B Plant reproccssing canyons and the U03 PIant, 
demonstrating that decommissioning could be completed much more rapidly than originally 
planned, and at a cost significantly lowcr than previously projected. The primary benefits of 
accelcmted decommissioning wcre early elimination of the safety and environmental risks 
associated with the facilities and the ability to reallocate hundreds of millions of dollars inso- 
I 
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callcd “mortgage,” or “min-safe” costs to other site cleanup priorities. ]The lessons-lcamcd from 
these early pilot projccts have since bcen institutionalized by the now-defunct DOE National 
Facilities Deactivation Initiative in various DOE Iessons-learned documcnts and DOE’S 
dccommissioning rcquircmcnts and guidance documents. ]Recognition of the value-added by 
accelcratcd dccommissioning of high-hazard facilitics rcsultcd in increasing the funding priority 
for PFP and othcr similar D&D projccts across the Hanford site. 
During the spring and summer of 1999 a large team worked tirelcssly to reconstruct the baseline 
for D&D of PFP from the bottom up. Lcssons-lcamed from the recently complctcd canyon 
deactivation projccts were applied, including: 
Detailed definition of the project’s end points, 
0 Walkdowns and accumulation of dctailcd as& facility information rcgarding evcry 
building and hundrcds of individual work spaces, 
0 Application of “right to left planning;” beginning with the project’s cnd points and 
working backward to the as-is starting condition to assure every planned task was dircctIy 
related to achieving the dcsircd end point, 
Rcstructunng the pmjcct into multi-disciplincd ficld work tcams with clearly defincd, 
long range scopcs of work and cnd points. 
I 
Irnprovemcnts in plutonium stabilization and packaging were also imported from othcr DOE 
sites, notably SRS and WETS, and dcvclopcd in sevcnl onsite proccss development 
laboratories. Plans for packaging and shipping the plutonium invcntory were acceleratcd, 
including disposal of a larger portion of the inventory to WIPP as transuranic waste, and 
accelerated shipmcnt of product material to SRS. Negotiations with the State of Washington and 
US EPA rcgarding the cnd points for the project wcre finalizcd and conscnt order milcstoncs 
were established for exccution of the ncw projcct. The rcsults of the rc-planning effort wcre 
. significant. By applying the Icssons-learned from prior projccts, applying newly dcvclopcd 
approaches for accclcratcd dccommissioning, and investing more hcavily in carly deactivation 
and demolition, the schcdulcd completion date for the project was accelerated by 22 years, fmm 
2038 to 2016, and the life cycle cost was rcduccd by 50%, from $2.6 billion to $1.3 billion. 
Evcn as these changcs wcre being incorporated into the Hanford Site baseline, significant 
’ progress was being made elsewhere in the DOE complex in accelerating dccommissioning of 
high-hazard facilitics, notably at Fcrnald and WETS. Both DOE and the commcrcial nuclear 
dccommissioning industries wcre dcploying new technologics and new approachcs for cleanout, 
deactivation and dcmolition of these facilities. Developments at WETS, a plutonium weapons 
production complex, were particularly suitable for application at the PFP. Over the following 
two years, Fluor Hanford intcrfaccd heavily with othcr DOE and commcrcial nuclear 
decommissioning projccts in an effort to furthcr optimize and strcamline the PFP 
dccommissioning plan. DOE also pressed its contractors forward to accelerate the cleanup and 
dismantling of the inactive Environmental Management sites, with an eye to accelerating 
complction of the overall EM mission from 2070 to 2035, or cvcn 2025 where practicable. 
During 2002, the PFP closure planning team, supported by key rcprescntatives from othcr Fluor 
projccts, DOE-RL, industry, consultants and Battelle’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
(PNNL), again rcviscd thc PFP dccornmissioning plan to incorporate more rcccnt Icssons-leamcd 
and developmcnts, resulting in another 7 year improvcrncnt in overall schcdule, moving the 
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I 
estimated complction date from 2016 to 2009, and again reducing life cycle costs, this time by 
more than $300 million, bringing the total projcct cost from $1.3 billion to under $1 billion. 
Funding was accekratcd to support the project, and the new baseline was put into place in 
Dccembcr 2002. Among the breakthroughs incorporated in this phase of re-planning were: 
Additional process developments to accelerate completion of the stabilization and packaging 
elYort by anothcr year 
A second increase in the amount of material that could be treated, packaged and discarded to 
WIPP as TRU waste versus repackaging & product for shipment to SRS 
Accelerated initiation of dmmmissioning field work, in parallel with the last ycar of 
stabilization and packaging by focusing early work on inactive process arcas and facilitics 
Accelcratcd de-inventory shipments of the product material to anothcr DOE site, resulting in 
rcduccd sccurity rcquircmcnts and elimination of the associated costs and impacts on 
decommissioning 
A streamlined environmental regulatory strategy 
Import of“bcst practices” in decommissioning from WETS, Femald, other Iianford Site 
decommissioning and demolition projccts managcd by Fluor and Bcchtel Hanford, Inc, as 
well as applicable approachcs employcd in the commercial nuclear decommissioning field 
Re-sequencing of the overall work scope to focus on high hazard arcas and elimination of the 
most urgent risks first - primarily focused on rcducing the chcmical and radiological source 
terms - providing both a rapid rcduction in residual safety and environmental risk and 
reducing the workcr hazards and the cost and productivity impacts of hazard controls on 
subscqucnt dccommissioning work 
Involving the multi-disciplined field work teams directly in the work planning and the 
development of safe, innovative and efficient tools and work processes 
To assure that the plan had not become overly aggressive, two independent reviews of the new 
plan were performed prior to implementation in the site baseline. The first was in esscnce a 
“pecr review” conductcd by nearly a dozen project managers with significant expcricnce in 
dccommissioning high-hazard facilitics throughout the DOE complex and the commercial 
nuclear dccommissioning industry., Recommcndations and modifications proposal by that tcam 
were incorpoktcd in the plan prior to initiation of the second, higher level review. The final 
review was conducted by a group of senior managers, again rcprcsenting both DOE and 
commercial nuclcar companics and contractors, to review the plan and the risks associated with 
it from a more strategic level. Again, the results of that rcvicw wcre incorporated in h e  final 
plan prior to submittal to RL and incorporation in the site baseline. 
, 
MILESTONE NEGOTIATIONS WITH REGULATORY AGENCIES 
The Hanford site is subjcct to the Hanford Federal Facilities Compliance Act and Consent Ordcr 
(HFFCCO), an order of conscnt signal by the DOE, the U. S. Environmcntal Protection Agency, 
(EPA) and the Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE). Undcr the HFFCCO, negotiations 
for transition milestones begin within six months after the issuancc of a shutdown order. In the 
case of the PFP, the Nuclear Materials disposition and stabilization activities were ncccssary as 
precursor activities to the D&D “Transition” phase. This situation precipitated a crisis in the 
negotiations between the agencies, and formal negotiations initiated in 1337 endcd in failure. 
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The negotiations reached impasse on several key regulatory and operational issucs. The 1997 
negotiation was characterized by a strongly positional style, DOE and the regulatory personnel 
took hard lincs early in the negotiations and were unable to move to resolution of key issues after 
a year and a half. This rcsultcd in unhappy stakeholders, poor publicity and work delays as well 
as wounded relationships bctwcdn DOE and the regulatory community. 
In the 2000-2001 PFP negotiations, a completely different approach was suggestcd by DOE 
pcrsonnel and subsequently initiatcd: Collaborative or Relational Negotiations. Within 6 months 
of initiation the relational negotiation style resulted ixragreement betwccn the agencies on all key 
issucs. All parties were very plcascd with the results and all parties wcre relieved that protracted 
negotiations sessions were not needed with the new style of working together collaborative1 y to 
serve each other’s interests without compromising each party’s necds. 
Also key in the negotiations for PFP closure was the ability to scope the milestones appropfiately 
so that they were reasonable and achievable. This was made possible because of the dctailcd 
planning that had bccn done for the PFP Closure Projcct. 
To date, 10 of the 18 PFP regulatory milcstoncs have bccn completed. All have been ahead of 
schcdde. The collaborative atmosphere that was the hallmark of the PFP negotiations has 
continued as the work of cleaning out PFP progresses through the forum of the Projcct Managcr 
Mcctings which are held monthly to status milcstone progress. 
PFP REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR D&D 
In gcncral, the strategy at PFP is to perform most of deactivation undcr standard operational 
pmccdurcs, documented through the appropriate National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
process, and complying with waste and air regulations. Additional deactivation and then 
dismantlement is conducted under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liubilify A d  of I980 (CERCLA) and documented as a removal action lhrough an 
Engineering EvaluationlCost Analysis (EWCA). Decommissioning includes both deactivation 
and dismantlement. 
Because PFP was on a fast track toward closure, the regulatory scheme of compliance necdcd to 
be flexible enough to allow stabilization activities, regular operations and maintenance activities, 
and dcactivation activities, to occur simultaneously. Conscquently a regulatory strategy was 
developcd that accommodated the non-CERCLA activities at some areas of PFP while CERCLA 
activities were accomplished in other areas of PFP. Basically, the strategy allowed for 
deactivation activities to occur undcr the appropriate NEPA, air and waste regulations until 
CERCLA EE/CAs were preparcd and resulting action memoranda were put into place. Upon the 
issuance of an action memorandum, the deactivation activities would then be accomplishcd 
undcr CERCLA through the appropriate implementing documents such as the Removal Action 
Work Plan. This stratcgy cnsurcd that work was not schcdule constrained while EUCAs wcre 
developed and Action Mcmoranda wcre signcd by the appropriate agcncies. The joint EPA/DOE 
policy on Decommissioning was key to the PFP strategy. 
The PFP regulatory strategy was developed to comply with all applicable cnvironmcntal laws 
and regulations andor compliance agreements during PFP stabilization, deactivation, and 
. 
, 
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eventual dismantlcmcnt. Significant environmental driven for the PFP Nuclear Material 
Stabilization Project include the Tri-Party Agreement; the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976 (RCRA); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa!ion and Liabilip 
Act of1980 (CERCLA); the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA); the National 
Historic Preservation Act (”PA); the Clean Air Act (CAA), and the Clean Water Act (CWA). 
STABILIZATION AND REPACKAGING OF PLUTONIUM BEARlNC MATERIALS 
Plutonium bearing material in various forms suchas liquid, powder and scrap metal was locatcd 
throughout the PFP. A key prcdeccssor activity to the D&D of PFP was the stabilization and 
management of the plutonium bearing material. Gcncrally speaking, materials containing greater 
than 30 percent plutonium wcfc stabilizcd and thcn packagcd to meet the DOE# 3013 standard 
for long-term storage pending eventual shipment to an offsite storage facility. Materials with less 
than 30 percent plutonium and less than 20% plutonium in aggregate were stabilized and 
packaged for disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Ncw Mexico. 
The pathway to the WIPP was intended to accommodate several groupings of specific pmcssing 
rcsidues, and all of the transuranic waste packages that result from dcmolition of the PFP 
buildings and their contcnts. Prior to prcparing any residue wastcs for disposal to the WIPP, 
sevcnl major activities had to be complctcd. As detailed a proccssing history as possible of the 
material including origin of the waste was researched and documcntcd. A technical basis for 
termination of safeguards on the material was prcparcd and approvcd. These activities involvcd 
sevcral organizations including Fluor Hanford, DOE, state rcpresentativcs and othcr rcgulators 
such as EPA. At PFP, a process has bccn developed for mccting the many, varied requirements, 
and has bccn successfully used to prepare residue waste streams including Rocky Flats 
incinerator ash, Hanford incinerator ash, and Sand, Slag and Crucible (SS&C) material for . 
disposal. Thcse waste rcsiducs were packed into Pipe Ovcrpack Containcrs (POC) in order to 
mcct sccurity rcquircmcnt and thcn shippcd to the WIPP. 
INNOVATIVE TECIINOLOGIES AND PROJECT EXECUTION TECHNIQUES 
Workforce pcrsonnel have devebpcd ingcnious methods to improve efficiency in glove box 
cleanout and waste packaging. One is called the “Lazy Susan”. The Lazy Susan was developed 
by the 232-2 incincrator facility pcrsonncl. They rccommcndcd a turntable be used to place 
sealcd out waste packages in ordcr to perform dose rating and portable Nondestructive Assay 
(NDA). The operator performing the analyscs has a platform that will allow the position of the 
package to be changcd with minimal handling, thcrcby rcducing dose to the fissile material 
handlcr. This approach also rcduccs the risk of brcaching plastic layers by abrasion or 
puncturing from multiple liRing and movements rcquired to obtain adcquate dose rates and NDA 
rncasurcmcnts. 
I 
Another invention developed and uscd by plant forces is called the “keel haul tool”. Also uscd to 
facilitate NDA measurcmcnts, the keel haul tool rcduces contamination risks and cnhanccs 
A L A M  practiccs in the decommissioning of the PFP’s open faced hoods. The keel haut tool 
allows the backside of the b m e  plate of the process reflux hoods to be cleancd by pulling a 
sponge attached to cables over the bame plate which is otherwise inaccessible. 
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The "turkey roaster" or rigid port bag is an innovation that proves the mother of invention is 
necessity. Before the rigid port bag was invented by plant forces, in order to perform glovebox 
cleanout, each piece of contaminated equipment within the glovebox had to be padded, wrapped, 
taped and then sealed out of the glovebox into a plastic seal out bag. Sometimes sharp points on 
the equipment breached the bag despite careful handling. The rigid port bag, which looks 
somewhat like a turkey roaster, was invented to enable operators to seal out as mwh as four 
times the contaminated equipment from gloveboxes per shift as had been achievable with 
traditional equipment. The device consists of a stainless steel can with handles on each side and 
a seal out bag that fits around the outer rim. It connects to the glovebox port with a large elastic 
band similar to a bungee cord. Glovebox cleanout is now quicker and radiation dose is lower. 
Additionally, plant staff has developed a new comprehensive method to track workers on daily 
work assiguments within the highly contaminated Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF). A 
magnetic board identifies PRF status, canyon entries, cross support and attendance codes. Each 
worker has an assigned magnet that is placed where hdshe is working in the plant. This board is 
updated daily to reflect current work assiguments providing management an instantaneous 
snapshot of resource allocation and location and is invaluable for possible emergency situations 
that involve facility evacuations, personnel accountability, and medical emergencies. 
Fig. 1. The rigid port bag being used to remove contaminated glovebox equipment. 
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I 
One of the issues the workers dealt with concerned cleaning out gloveboxes contaminated with 
transuranic waste to a clean enough state to be considered low level waste. Chemicals evaluated 
for decontamination of gloveboxes in PFP included cerium (N) nitrate in a nitric acid solution, 
and proprietary commercial solutions that include acids and sequestering agents. Aggressive 
chemicals commonly used to remove transuranic contaminants h m  process equipment 
allowing disposal of the equipment as low level waste. Fluor’s decontamination procedure 
involves application of chemical solutions as a spray on the contaminated surfaces, followed by a 
wipe-down with rags. Alternatively, a process of applying oxidizing Ce IV ions contained in a 
gel matrix and vacuuming a dry gel material has been evaluated. These processes effectively 
transfer the transuranic materials to rags or a gel matrix which is then packaged as TRU waste 
for disposal. 
Fluor investigated plutonium decontamination chemicals as a result of concerns regarding the 
safety of chemical procedures following a fire at Rocky Flats in 2003. The fire at Rocky Flats 
occurred in a glovebox that had been treated with cerium nitrate, which is one of the 
decontamination chemicals that Fluor Hanford had proposed to use. Although the investigation 
of the fire was not conclusive as to cause, the reviewers noted that rags were found in the 
glovebox, suggesting that the combination of rags and chemicals may have contributed to the 
fire. Because of this underlying uncertainty, Fluor began an investigation into the potential for 
fire from self heating when using the chemicals and materials, using wet disposition and dry 
disposition of the waste generated in the decontamination process, and the storage conditions to 
which the waste drum would be exposed.[ 1,2] The focus of this work was to develop a disposal 
strategy that provides a chemically stable waste form at expected Hanford waste storage 
temperatures. H d o r d  waste storage conditions are such that heat is added to the containers 
fiom ambient conditions during storage especially during the summer months. The result of the 
studies, the only studies of this kind pdormed in the DOE complex, d e t d n e d  that the cerium 
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nitrate method used with cotton rags was problematic. A pro rietary gel formulation from 
France has been tested as well and showed promising results. 1: 
D&D PROGRESS AT PFP 
PFP workers have made great progress in the isolation and deactivation of contaminated 
equipment and the clean out and removal of chemical systems. Key accomplishments include: 
Completed Legacy Process Holdup removal and disposition on June 30,2005, 15 months 
ahead of ’ P A  Milestone. Over seventy percent of the plutonium holdup was removed 
and dispositioned and the security area within the plutonium processing area of the 234- 
5Z facility was eliminated. 
0 Successfully completed the first manned entry into 236-2, the Plutonium Reclamation 
Facility (PRF) canyon in 14 years. There have been an additional 8 entries made to date. 
0 Completed RCRA closure of the LLW HA-20MB glovebox on October 28,2004 - 17 
months ahead of schedule 
0 Decontaminated forty-four (44) glove-boxes in 234-52, the primary plutonium 
processing facility, to low-level waste criteria, removed chemicals and equipment from 
twenty-two (22) hoods and gloveboxes in the Standards and Analytical Laboratories and 
completed decontamination of glovebox 235-B2 (Hanford’s first plutonium glovebox) to 
low level waste criteria 
Completed demolition of ten ancillary facilities 4 % months ahead of schedule 0 
In achieving these milestones, PFP accumulated two million safe-hours without a lost work day 
injury on two separate occasions. 
Fig.3. A typical ancillary facility is undergoing demolition. 
’ Saji?ty Studies To Measure Exothermic Reactions ofspent Plutonium Decontamination Chemicals Using Wet And 
D I ~  Decontamination Method, A. H q b ,  G.W. Jackson, , M. Minette J. Ewalt, T. Cooper, S. Charboneau, P. 
ScoR S. Jones, R. Scheele, ICEM, Scotland, September, 2005. 
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Significant progress has also been made in decontamination and removal of equipment and 
decontamination of various PFP facilities. 
Progress to date includes: 
0 
e 
Completed isolation of 241-2 from Hanford’s underground Tank Farms on 
December 8,2004,6 112 months ahead of the associated TPA milestone. 
Completed characterization work for all five of the 241-2 underground cells and 
initiated removal of waste and TRU tanks and piping. 
Made significant progress in cleanout and deactivation of the 2322 Incinerator 
facility, including removal of the large process glovebox. The facility will be the 
first high-hazard nuclear facility at PF’P to be demolished late this summer. 
Completed initial entry into the highly contaminated 242-2 Americium extraction 
facility for characterization of the facility. The facility was sealed after a resin- 
filled column exploded, spreading contamination throughout this Americium 
Recovery facility. The facility was sealed following the accident in 1976 and 
remained sealed for 15 years. PFP workers made entries into the facility during 
the D8D effort and were able to enhance fire protection of the facility and 
provide valuable information for the planned decontamination of this highly 
contaminated facility. 
13 of 63 buildings have been demolished. 
I I 
Fig. 4. PFP workers readied to make entry into the 242-2 facility. 
CHANGE IN PFP MISSION 
Despite the tremendous progress in D&D of the PFP, work has recently been suspended on many 
of the facilities and others are being brought to a safe shutdown condition. The cessation of 
D&D work on the facility is being driven by a combination of events, including decreased 
funding available for site cleanup, increased funding requirements for other Hdord projects and 
a delay in plans to ship the product plutonium to DOE’S Savannah River Site necessitating a 
longer term plutonium storage mission at Hanford. The PFP baseline is now being re-planned to 
extend completion from 2009 back to the interim 2016 target, which would support completion 
of the negotiated TPA milestones. The change in mission for the PFP from closure to longer 
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term SNM storage has resulted in a series of efforts to reassess the status of the PFP facility and 
the safety envelope under which it operates. While PFP was engagcd fully in the D&D effort 
with a vision toward slab-on-grade, the nuclear safety basis document, the PFP DSA, was 
dcsigncd for the D&D activities and was based in part on the demoiition of the entire PFP 
complex of buildings by 2009. Since PFP will not be slab-on-grade by 2009, the nuclear safety 
basis for maintaining PFP must be re-evaluated for the different conditions that could reasonably 
be expcctcd to cxist at PFP for up to an additional 30 years. 
The longcr term plutonium storage mission for PFP has also incrcascd the funding rcquircmcnts 
to maintain the facility and its SNM inventory in a safe, secure and compliant condition. The 
DOE recently re-evaluated potential thrcats to the nation's SNM inventory, resulting in an 
upgrading of sccurity rcquircmcnts. The new requirements have a significant impact on the 
continued storage of SNM at PFP. The upgrades ncccssary to mcet these requirements include: 
the retention of the PFP Protected Area, a more robust, secure storage facility, life 
extcnsioddccoupling of the existing vault support facilities, the installation of more detection 
equipment. asscssmcnt and delay capabilities and a larger and bcttcr cquippcd rcsponsc force. 
To achieve the objcctives stated, construction of new facilities and upgrades of older systems at 
PFP will be necessary. This of course will extcnd the life of the PFP Closure Projcct and affcct 
the Hanford Sitc infrastructure in ways that arc still being evaluated. Since several facilitics are 
bcing prcpared for an cxtcndcd lay-up period prior to dccommissioning, a hazards analysis is 
currently being conducted to evaluate the condition of old process lines with chemical and 
radiological hold-up, an old HVAC system and glovcbox conditions. At the same time, PFP 
management is looking at new approaches that will minimize the life-cycle costs for the aging 
facility pcnding availability of a final disposition path for the plutonium inventory and the 
ncccssary funding to re-start D&D. 
CONCLUSION 
The succcss of the PFP D&D effort is primarily due to the dctailcd yet flexible approach to 
planning that applicd innovative techniqucs and tools, involved a team of expcricnccd 
independent revicwers, and incorporatcd previous lessons leamcd at the Hanford site, Rocky ' 
Flats, and commercial nuclear D&D projects. Dedication to the plan and the use of innovative 
approachcs by projcct managers and workcn in the exccution of thc work kept PFP D&D well 
ahead of schedule. Trcmcndous progrcss was made in a short time frame in the deactivation and 
decontamination of PFP. 
Currently, the D&D activities are shutting down and wiIl be delayed as PFP preparcs for storage 
of SNM. Interim lay-up of the facility is currently being exccutcd and construction activities for 
a new storage structure are bcing planned. Design of storage and support facilitics is taking 
place at this time. 
Page 12 of 13 
Page 17 of 17 of DA01777038 
WM’06 Conference. February ZdMarch 2,2006, Tucson, AZ 
REFERENCES 
1 .The Use of a Treatability Study to Investigate the Potential for Sel/-heating and Exothermic 
Reactions in Decontamination Materials at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, J. Ewalt, A. Hopkins, 
C. Simiele, R. Scheele, P. Scott, D. Trent, S. Charboncau, WM 2005, Tucson, AZ, March, 2005 
2. Treatabilily Studies Used to Test for Erothermic Reactions of Plutonium Decontamination 
Chemicals, J. Ewalt, M .  MiMctte, A. Hopkins, T. Coopcr, P. Scott, R Schcclc, S. Jones, S. 
Charboncau, American Nuclear Society DD&R, 2005 
Page 13 of 13 
